Per tort law, there is a presumption of guilt when there is negligence per se. That is to say, when one party committed a wrong that may be unrelated, there is a rebuttable presumption that such party is at fault. A common application of negligence per se applies to an automobile accident wherein one of the parties was speeding. While it may be that the speeding had no bearing on the accident, negligence per se states that we assume that the party speeding is at fault and it is incumbent on that party to prove otherwise.
With respect to maritime accidents, the same applies. Negligence per se suggests fault when one party to an accident is not licensed. As a result, a rebuttable presumption presumes fault for the party not licensed and that party must prove otherwise in a court of law. Sometimes, this doctrine can get very complicated.
Shell Oil v. Tesla Offshore
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling that found Tesla Offshore and a co-defendant responsible for $9 million for an accident that occurred in 2012. In that case, Shell oil operated an offshore oil drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. To properly maintain balance for the rig, Shell Oil attached submerged mooring lines the keep the rig in proper position. A reconnaissance fleet of ships for an archaeological survey owned by Tesla Offshore and partially operated by International Offshore damaged the mooring lines that in turn significantly damaged the rig. This led to Shell Oil losing significant profit due to the loss of drilling profits from the sale of oil.
Part of the reconnaissance fleet included a ship called “Thunder” that pulled a towfish that would survey the area from beneath the ocean’s surface. As part of the litigation, it was determined that the captain of Thunder did not have a license to operate a “towing vessel.” Part of the issue is whether the lack of a license creates an assumption of fault due to the negligence per se doctrine.
The Fifth Circuit cited the United States Code that a “towing vessel” as “a commercial vessel engaged in or intending to engage in the service of pulling, pushing, or hauling along side, or any combination of pulling, pushing, or hauling along side.” Clearly, the Thunder was acting in a “towing” manor.
However, a potential issue not raised at trial was whether the Thunder qualified as a “commercial vessel” under the US Code. A commercial vessel is part of the definition and would help determine whether the captain of the Thunder was required to hold a license. In turn, this would create or discredit. a negligence per se argument. The Fifth Circuit notes that a commercial vessel is “any type of trade or business involving the transportation of goods or individuals, except service performed by a combatant vessel.” A survey ship is not involved in the transportation of goods or individuals and therefore not a commercial vessel. In turn, it would not need a license. As mentioned, this argument was not presented to the court.
Involved in a maritime accident? Contact the Kolodny firm, a maritime injury law firm.
Alan Kolodny is committed to representing injured clients in Texas and throughout the United States. Alan earned his B.A. from Rice University and his J.D. from Southern Methodist University.
He focuses his practice on representing plaintiffs in personal injury cases involving the following matters: maritime and offshore accidents, including those under the Jones Act; automobile and 18-wheeler truck accidents; and industrial site accidents, work-related accidents, and claims for injured railroad workers under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
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